

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1975

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
APPLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK CHENEY  
BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JACK MARSH/BILL HYLAND 

1. The following information should be treated on a very close hold basis since Congressman McClory has met with us concerning the information and is desirous at this time that other Members of the Committee not be aware of his activity in this regard.
2. Attached is a series of documents which have been sanitized for declassification purposes. A request has been made by the House Select Committee for approval of their declassification for further Committee use. This request is now pending before the NSC. You should be aware that in addition to Committee staff who have been working on this project, thus far only Congressmen Pike and McClory are believed to be aware of these documents.
3. The documents the Committee has picked relate to highly sensitive subjects. This limited selection does not objectively portray or explain the SALT-hold procedures so that the conclusion reached on first examination by a person without background leads to conclusions that could be very adverse insofar as we are concerned. In fact, Bob McClory called late yesterday to express grave concerns and he visited with me personally at the White House this morning to further outline his views. After a meeting with myself, Friedersdorf, Buchen and Hyland, he left with a much better understanding of the situation although I do not feel he is completely satisfied.
4. From McClory we learned of a likely Committee effort to try to move this subject into the public sector probably early this

MORI/CDF per  
C03206626

May contain Congressional  
material.

SECRET/EYES ONLY

-2-

week. Over the weekend, we understand staff are attempting to interview Cline, Proctor, de Poix and probably others to obtain information. McClory believes that Pike will ask the Committee on Tuesday to request their approval for declassification and publication which would be subject to the President's certification unless such permission was previously granted. Although this subject is not relevant to the contempt citation, nevertheless it can be troublesome from the standpoint of creating an unfavorable environment when the House considers the citation on Thursday, unless we take steps to offset this one-sided presentation.

5. Those of us who have been working on this here feel it is essential to develop a concise and orderly presentation for each of the instances cited in the attached documents. This is necessary to not only bring the matter into proper perspective, but to rebut the allegations as they now appear in isolated form. Hyland and a number of members of his staff have been working continuously since we learned of this to pull together the facts and other memoranda necessary to prepare this type of presentation.
6. Further, we feel that it is necessary to move the first of the week into the public forum with a broader SALT verification statement supported by more detailed backup which can be provided on a sensitive basis to the Pike Committee and other appropriate Committees of the Congress. In this regard, you may wish to accelerate the SALT white paper which is nearing completion.
7. We are also pressing for a briefing of the Select Committee by Duckett in order that they can have at hand the total picture rather than be influenced by a limited selected presentation as reported by these documents.
8. In addition to the events that are underway in preparation for a House vote on Thursday, it is my view that we should be prepared to brief key Congressional leaders on the SALT-hold matter in order to minimize as much as possible this issue.

-3-

9. The Hyland group has been tasked to have available for use early Monday morning a paper which develops fully the SALT-hold matter.
10. Although we are dealing with a matter that relates to the House, nevertheless on this particular issue we must also be prepared to move quickly to the Senate and brief key Senate leaders to offset any public criticism that might come from that body.
11. Because of the sensitivity of this subject, we feel phone conversations should be minimal, if at all.

In the meantime, we would appreciate any help and guidance you might have.

NOTE: The letter to Pike from Buchen which you approved has been delivered to his office with copies to the offices of other Committee Members. It was changed as per your instructions.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

C(S-H-H-42)



25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

4 December 1975

Mr. A. Searle Field  
Staff Director  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Attention: Mr. Rushford

Dear Mr. Field:

Attached are some documents which Mr. Rushford read at CIA Headquarters on 4 December. He has asked that copies be transmitted to your Staff offices.

Some of these documents concern a USIB Steering Group meeting on SALT held 24 October 1972. Another document dated 1 November 1974 is a list of SALT related items requiring action by Dr. Kissinger.

The documents in which Mr. Rushford had the greatest interest deal with a "hold" item dealing with suspect Soviet silo holes. For your information, the item was published as an intelligence report to the appropriate customers on 8 August 1973.

Sincerely,

*DP Gregg*  
Donald P. Gregg  
Review Staff

Attachments:  
As stated

25X1

Page 1 of 1  
Copy of 10

INTERNAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Prohibited

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

( OFFICE OF THE DD/1 (

24 October 1972

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of USIB Steering Group  
on SALT, 24 October 1972

At today's meeting of the USIB Steering Group on SALT, we discussed the need for limiting the dissemination of its reports. The case in point was a draft report dealing with Item 1

The draft transmittal memo from the DCI to Kissinger says further dissemination is being withheld, but that the DCI could supply copies for the Verification Panel if Kissinger thinks it appropriate.

I emphasized that the members of the Steering Group should hold the information until the DCI heard from Kissinger. In response to that, Ray Cline said that he must keep people like Rogers and Johnson informed about all substantive findings of the Steering Group when such findings are made. de Poix said that he was in a similar position. General Walters said that he realized that we "all live in the real world" indicating some sort of concurrence.

(Cont'd)

C  
U  
R  
R  
E  
N  
T  
I  
N  
F  
O  
R  
M  
A  
T  
I  
O  
N

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

( OFFICE OF THE DD/I )

Page Two

Subject: Meeting of USIB Steering Group  
on SALT, 24 October 1972

Ray Cline also asked that he be informed  
about any new information bearing on SALT  
that we might be withholding from publication,  
e.g., Item 2

He said that he would keep this sort of information  
to himself until it was released. I said that  
I would find out if this could be done.

Ed Proctor

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

**TOP SECRET**



( OFFICE OF DEPT/1 (

25 October 1972

7.6  
133

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Information  
Bearing on SALT Monitoring

This morning I told the Director about the discussion concerning dissemination of reports from the Steering Group for SALT. I told him that both Cline and de Poix felt that they had to inform their principals about findings of the Steering Panel before dissemination might be authorized by Kissinger. The Director's response was that we should put things through the Steering Panel mechanism only when we thought it would do no harm to have the information released. He said that we should try to keep things that were not ready for release within (a building) until we were ready to have the word "spread all over town."

I also related Cline's request for alerts to hold items connected with SALT. He said that I should not respond to this request.

Ed Proctor

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Odeen

Phil--

Attached is a draft of the USIB monitoring report for your review. The Item 1 material is covered on pages iii, 20-21, and 30-31 (clipped).

Please note that the draft does not include anything on the Item 3. Even if you have no problems with the draft as it stands, I would recommend against issuing the report without any discussion of the Item 3.


16 July 1973

Edward W. Proctor  
Deputy Director for Intelligence (DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-10N  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

(47)

*Never sent*



TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

13 July 1973

**NOTE FOR THE RECORD**

At yesterday's Morning Meeting, Duckett reported on the session he and D/ OSR had Wednesday with Odeen and other NSC Staffers on the hold item. He felt that the hold situation was getting worse rather than better.

At this point in time, the hold on [ ] is still on and there is little likelihood that it will be lifted soon.

Odeen would like to see a draft of the Monitoring Report with the Item 1 item in it to recommend to Kissinger whether the Report should be published and whether it should have the Item 1 item in it. (There had been some confusion about whether Item 3 should also be in the Report, but it was D/OSR impression--later checked with the NSC Staff--that it should not be.) Frank Reynolds is to have the draft ready later today.

After talking with General Walters around noon yesterday, I called Ray Cline to tell him about the status outlined above. Cline was of course disappointed. He said that he had talked to Rush about the situation. Although Rush recalled being briefed by Duckett on Item 3 shortly after they were discovered, his recollection was very vague. Rush had not realized that Secretary Rogers had not been briefed. Ray reported that Rush was very concerned that Alex Johnson and Sid Graybeal had not been told. Rush is to talk to Rogers and urge that Rogers talk to Kissinger to get permission to tell Johnson and Graybeal.

I tried to reach Admiral de Poix yesterday, but he was on the hill. He will call back today.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

\* Admiral de Poix returned my call at about 1030 today and I relayed the substance of the second and third paragraphs above. Admiral de Poix was quite concerned about the continuation of the hold. After some discussion, he recommended: "The DCI should go directly to the President and inform him of the problem." I told de Poix that something like this was being considered. (Earlier this morning I had discussed with General Walters and Mr. Colby the DCI's obligation--ala Watergate--to make sure that the President knew of the withholding of intelligence, was aware of the consequences of prolonged delay in informing others in the Executive and Legislative Branches, and nonetheless had approved the continuation of the restrictions.)

I gave the attached memo (dated 13 July- [redacted] to General Walters at about 1430 to take with him to a meeting with Kissinger and Scowcroft. Just before I gave General Walters the memo, D/OSR [redacted] called to say that Odeen had asked D/OSR to brief Graybeal on these and other developments. General Walters was informed of this before he left.

25X1

16 July 1973

General Walters and Carl Duckett met with Scowcroft and Kissinger, separately and together.

Neither Duckett nor General Walters discussed my 13 July memorandum with Kissinger. General Walters did discuss it with Scowcroft and left a copy of my memo with Scowcroft for discussion with Kissinger.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Meanwhile, a clean draft of the USIB monitoring report was prepared for review by Odeen. This draft covers the Item 1 material but has nothing on the Item 3. I discussed this matter with General Walters who said not to send the draft to Odeen until we had the matter of the /cleared up. After talking to Scowcroft around noon today, General Walters reported that Scowcroft would be talking with Kissinger about Item 3 /and would be getting back to General Walters tomorrow.

20 July 1973

At about 1800 on 18 July, \_\_\_\_\_ reported to me that he had heard that there will be no release on Item 3 until Kissinger had seen the paper on what the Soviets could do to convince us that Item 3. At the Morning Meeting of 19 July, General Walters reported the same. He urged that the paper be ready for him to bring to the SALT VP meeting later that afternoon.

At the Morning Meeting on 20 July, Duckett reported that Kissinger had read the paper on what the Soviets might do to convince us about Item 3. Kissinger was not satisfied with the paper. He asked that we try again. Meanwhile, we have been instructed to prepare an annex for the USIB SALT Monitoring Report on the matter of Item 3. This together with the entire draft is to be sent down to either Kissinger or Odeen for review. General Walters mentioned that he and Duckett might take the package down personally. General Walters again expressed his concern about the length of time ("it's now 31 days since we informed the NSC.") that this information is being held.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

13 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : The "Hold" On Item 3

1. It is now 24 days since we reported to Dr. Kissinger on the detection of several  
Item 3

During this period this and related evidence have been held in a strict hold status on instructions of the NSC Staff. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger learned of the matter as Director of CIA, and Admiral de Poix indicated that he had briefed Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, Admiral Moorer, and Mr. Nitze and General Rowan of the SALT delegation. The only other senior officials outside CIA and the NSC staff who have been informed are Dr. Cline and Undersecretary of State Rush, who was briefed with NSC Staff authorization. No one else in ACDA or the State Department is aware of this information, nor, of course, are any members of the key Congressional Committees concerned with SALT verification matters. Among those not now authorized to know about the matter are Ambassador Johnson, head of the SALT delegation, and Sidney Graybeal, the US Commissioner on the US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission set up to deal with problems of compliance with the strategic arms limitation accords.

2. A principal reason for establishing the "hold" on this information was to insure that there be no leakage while the Soviets were being queried on the matter, and our general expectation was that once these delicate exchanges had been completed the "hold" could be readily lifted. However, progress of the dialogue so far suggests that though the exchanges may be ultimately be successful in defusing the problem, they are not likely to produce an early definitive result.

25X1

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

3. Under the circumstances I feel obliged to recapitulate for you how much of a bind the indefinite continuation of the "hold" on this material puts us in. As you know, Item 3 were detected after routine dissemination had been made to a dozen or more shops throughout the world under the standard procedures of the [redacted] and a number of people within the intelligence community are aware of the evidence even though knowledge has been more than usually limited. Meanwhile, we face increasing problems in carrying out normal intelligence reporting responsibilities without either disclosing the hold material or raising suspicions that important information is being withheld. One case in point, as you know, is that of the SALT Monitoring Report in which the USIB Steering Group regularly reports to a select group of some 15 senior officials concerned with SALT matters on the status of Soviet compliance with the 1972 accords.

4. Thus the longer the present situation continues, the more likely it is that additional people will inadvertently become aware of it. Moreover, the longer the information is held as closely as it is, the more likely is it that questions will arise as to why others with specific responsibilities and concerns regarding Soviet compliance with strategic arms control agreements were not brought in.

5. At this stage, I think that you as Acting Director of CIA must get concrete assurance from Dr. Kissinger that the President is aware of the decision to withhold this information from key officials in the Executive Branch and from members of Congress who would almost certainly feel that they have the right and a need to know about the problem and that the President is also aware of our concern. The President should be aware of the potential difficulty of trying to answer a question, say from Senator Jackson, as to why this information has been withheld from the key committees of the Congress, and from such directly concerned officials as Ambassador Johnson and Commissioner Graybeal, when the Administration has known about it for almost a

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

month or more. Another complication is that persons who do know about the matter, such as Secretary Schlosinger, Mr. Colby and Admiral de Poix, are frequently called to testify before committees of the Congress on Soviet strategic matters and may be asked to comment on Soviet compliance with the 1972 agreements. Although there are ways in which they could truthfully answer without immediately compromising the "hold" information, such an answer would presumably hasten the time when full disclosure would be demanded.

6. At a minimum I think you should seek Dr. Kissinger's assurance that he has informed or will inform the President of this situation and the concerns it generates. In addition, I think you should press for an early decision on release of the information to additional persons with an identifiable need to know. I will not presume to judge how the problem of dealing with key members of Congress should be handled. I do think, however, that there is a strong case for informing Secretary of State Rogers, Ambassador Johnson, Commissioner Graybeal, and his Deputy SCC Commissioner, Brigadier General William Georgi. If desirable, they could be briefed orally. Indeed, a good case could be made for informing all of those on the select list of recipients of the USIB Steering Group SALT Monitoring Report.



EDWARD W. PROCTOR

Deputy Director for Intelligence

**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

1 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Items Requiring Action by Dr. Kissinger

You asked for a list of materials pending which require some kind of action by Dr. Kissinger. The only such materials involving this Directorate are a number of "hold" items which we have sent to Dr. Kissinger, advising him we were withholding further dissemination of the information awaiting his guidance. This list is stated in the attachment.



PAUL V. WALSH  
Associate Deputy Director  
for Intelligence

Attachment

Distribution:

- Copy 1 - Director
- 2 - DDCI
- 3 - Executive Registry
- 4 - DDI
- 5 - D/OSR
- 6 - OSR/

- 7 - DDI Chrono
- 8 - DDI file

25X1

Copy No. 9

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

"Hold" Items Awaiting Instruction  
from Dr. Kissinger

Item 4

Reported

In memorandum from the DCI  
to Dr. Kissinger, dated  
23 October 1974.

Item 5

In memorandum from the DCI  
to Dr. Kissinger, dated  
12 September 1974 and 8 October  
1974.

Item 6

In memorandum from the DCI  
to Dr. Kissinger, dated 26 July  
1974.

Item 6 and  
Item 7

In memorandum from Chief, SAIC  
Support Staff, to Mr. Peter  
Zimmerman, NSC Staff, dated  
28 June 1974. (This memorandum  
was the basis of a draft cable to  
be sent to Dr. Kissinger in Moscow.

Copy No. 9

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Phone call from Colonel Merritt, NSC Staff

1. Jack Merritt called today in connection with the recently received SALT baseline report. He said he had been asked to get in touch with us and say that, in the reports of the intelligence community concerning SALT monitoring, Dr. Kissinger wanted to avoid any written judgments to the effect that the Soviets have violated any of the SALT agreements. If the Director believes that the Soviets may be in violation, this should be the subject of a memorandum from him to Dr. Kissinger. The judgment that a violation is considered to have occurred is one that will be made at the NSC level.

2. Colonel Merritt asked that I pass this on to Mr. Duckett and Dr. Proctor.

3. I told him I would relay his message and pointed out that I thought our whole approach to this matter was in line with what he had just said. I reminded him that the position of the Director has historically been that the intelligence community considers itself responsible for monitoring SALT agreements but that the question of verifying them is considered to be the business of the policy level of the government.

Director  
Strategic Research

25X1

Copies furnished:

- ✓ Deputy Director for Intelligence
- Deputy Director for Science & Technology
- Special Assistant to the DCI for SALT

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

5 July 1973

MEMORANDUM

Release of Recent Information

Item 1

1. The information from Item 1 was first brought to OSR's attention about noon on Friday, 29 June. IAS, briefed Dr. Proctor and Chief/Salt Support Staff and asked the DDI if the information should be embargoed. Dr. Proctor solicited the view of Chief/SSS and D/OSR. Both recommended that it not be embargoed. Dr. Proctor concurred and advised IAS who released a cable on Monday afternoon.

2. The recommendation not to embargo the information on Item 1

--Soviet measures Item 1 have been noted since September 1971.

The information and its possible relationship to Item 1 program have been discussed in a number of reports and each SALT Monitoring Report published since August 1972. It also was brought to the attention of the NSC Staff in a special memorandum prepared by C/SSS as Chairman of the SALT Monitoring Group. The NSC Staff decided not to raise the issue of concealment to the Soviets as being in violation of the provisions of the interim SALT agreement.

25X1

25X1

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unclassified but Subject to

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

--Since then, other evidence of activity taking place Item 1 as well as other information which indicated that the Soviets were Item 1 and also has been reported in numerous publications.

3. The latest information was considered not to be substantially different from what already had been reported. It only added to the data base and strengthened the judgment that the Soviets appeared to be developing a Item 1 and were endeavoring to do so in such a way as to deny details of that development to US technical means of verification.

5. The use of concealment measures in this case also does not appear to be a violation of the Interim Agreement. Article V, paragraph 3, states "Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement..."

25X1

**TOP SECRET**

20/Fin